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Introduction 
The aim of social policy is to improve the wellbeing and quality of life for members of a society. 
Social policy is useful for tackling issues relating to health, education, poverty, unemployment, 
retirement, housing, and security. The welfare state is a solution to these issues, through which 
the government takes responsibility for the wellbeing of its citizens. The welfare state as we 
know it today is a relatively recent development. Just within the past century, a particular 
country has advanced to become one of the most comprehensive and inclusive welfare states in 
modern times; this country is Norway. The unique welfare exhibited in Norway, and other 
Nordic countries, is referred to as social democratic welfare. This welfare state is built around 
the concept of universal benefits for all citizens.  
 The Nordic countries make fascinating case studies in social policy because they are 
some of the only welfare states to employ such a broad range and volume of universal benefits. 
The Nordic countries also culturally unique, displaying unusually high rates of trust, social 
cohesion, happiness, and social consensus. The unique combination of these universal benefits 
and social characteristics describe what is referred to as the Nordic model. In my thesis I 
specifically focus on the Norwegian welfare state. Many have wondered what makes their 
welfare system so successful. The two most obvious answers are either the universalism of its 
welfare system or Nordic exceptionalism.1 While social factors undoubtedly play a significant 
role, I argue that universalism plays a significant role in the successful functioning of the 
Norwegian welfare state. 
 This thesis will consist of four main sections. First, I will discuss the background and 
history of the Norwegian welfare state, along with a review of the literature on universalism in 
 
1 Nordic exceptionalism refers to the Nordic culture of social cohesion, solidarity, and egalitarianism. In essence, it 
is referring to the social characteristics.  
welfare. Second, I will be analyzing the Paradox of Redistribution (Korpi and Palme, 1998), 
which is a critical theory for understanding the role of universalism in welfare. Third, I will 
discuss my own research, replicating the work of Oliver Jacques and Alain Noel (2018) to focus 
on universalism and the paradox in the 21st century. Finally, I will describe the social factors at 
hand, including any exogenous factors that might be affecting these outcomes.  
  If the aim of social policy was to improve the wellbeing and welfare of others, it would 
be beneficial to explore the strategies and structures of other systems. If universalism could play 
a significant role in creating stronger, more inclusive and egalitarian social insurance, then it 
would be worthwhile to examine the case of Norway. 
 
Background and Literature Review 
A welfare state is a term applied to states that have assumed responsibility for ensuring the 
wellbeing and provision of social welfare for its citizens. As described by Gosta Esping-
Andersen (1991), there are two broad categories of welfare states, one being residual and the 
other institutional. As the term implies, a residual welfare state seeks to assist only the poor and 
marginalized citizens. Institutional welfare states, in contrast, provide benefits that are 
institutionalized to serve the entire population. Many of the contemporary welfare regimes fall 
somewhere on the spectrum connecting these two categories. Scholars, such as Esping-Andersen, 
have classified welfare regimes in groups along this spectrum.  
 Broadly, there are three types of welfare regimes: conservative, liberal, and social-
democratic. The Nordic model is a social-democratic welfare regime. The defining feature of this 
model is the principle of universalism, which ensures the same rights and duties for all citizens. 
Another structure is the liberal welfare state, which uses means-tested policies to serve as a 
safety net for the poorest citizens (Hilson, 2008) . These two types are compared most often 
since they are seen as being opposite ends of a spectrum. The third type outlined by Esping-
Andersen, the conservative welfare state provides social insurance programs to support the 
traditional family model, and are dependent on status. Many countries do not fit neatly into these 
categories and instead fall in different spots on the continuum. It is not so simple to sort nations 
into these groups, nor is it easy to compare different types. As stated before, the Nordic countries 
are social democratic welfare states and are some of the only ones.   
 Social democratic welfare began to form in the Nordic countries at the end of the 19th 
century, with policies for health insurance and pension plans emerging first. However, it would 
take many decades for these countries to reach the quality of welfare that exists there today. 
There were many obstacles these countries had to face, especially in Norway. Following 
industrialization, a new middle class emerged, and farmers were increasingly dependent on state 
aid. According to Esping-Andersen, the success of the Nordic welfare state stems from the red-
green coalition between farmers and the working class, and subsequent class mobilization 
(1991). However, the class struggles in Norway would mostly continue to be a source of 
antagonism and division up until World War II. The trade unions created during this time were 
vital to many of the first welfare policies, such as health care. When health insurance was 
introduced in 1909, it was initially restricted to factory workers. Through trial-and-error, it 
became clear that this system would not work. One primary reason was its targeted, class-based 
approach that only included factory workers. Later, in 1956, universal national health insurance 
was created, and it has evolved into the modern system (Sejersted, 2011). This contemporary 
social democratic welfare regime in Norway is highly characterized by universal policies, such 
as the health insurance program. 
 In the context of welfare and social insurance, what is universality? Universality refers to 
programs in which everyone receives benefits, regardless of class or status (Esping-Andersen, 
1991; Prince, 2014; Sejersted, 2011). The universal nature of Norway’s social benefits is 
essential in maintaining the strength and longevity of these welfare programs. There are several 
reasons universalism plays such a significant role in a welfare state’s success. Scholars in social 
policy will commonly cite three factors: the decommodification of labor, the decrease in the 
stigmatization of the poor, and the level of public support (Esping-Andersen, 1991; Prince, 2014; 
Korpi & Palme, 1998). 
 
Decommodification of labor 
These factors mentioned above are products of universal welfare programs, but they also make 
these programs successful. First is the decommodification of labor. When labor is treated as a 
commodity (the same as goods to be bought and sold) the worker is put at risk. The 
commodification of labor became increasingly common as laissez-faire capitalism emerged. 
During this time, workers’ social benefits became tied to their employer. In many countries with 
higher levels of labor commodification, there was a shift, and the government's role was only to 
provide social assistance as a last resort when the market had failed. This is characteristic of the 
liberal welfare regime model (Esping-Andersen, 1991). When workers became dependent on 
their employers rather than the government, there was more at stake regarding their employment 
status. 
 As Esping-Andersen remarks, anything from illness to economic recession could be dire 
for the average worker (1991). This system inhibits the worker's ability to change jobs easily or 
take time off because their livelihood and survival are directly tied to their employer. Therefore, 
the decommodification of labor infers the workers’ ability to maintain a good quality standard of 
living, regardless of their employment. Having a comprehensive, universal system of social 
insurance provided by the government allows for the decommodification of labor. Data showing 
a comparatively high decommodification score for Nordic countries illustrate this principle 
(Esping-Andersen, 1991). The connection between universal welfare systems and labor 
decommodification is a significant factor contributing to the success of Norway’s welfare 
regime.  
 
 Stigmatization in welfare 
Another significant product of universalism is the de-stigmatization of the poor. A disadvantage 
of means-tested programs is that they usually stigmatize those receiving benefits and create 
significant class divisions (Esping-Andersen, 1991). Since social coalitions and solidarity are 
critical factors in the success of a welfare state, stigmatization and class division are significant 
problems. Social cleavages occur when targeted programs create middle-class resentment and 
open up discussions on the worthiness and deservingness of those receiving benefits. Research 
also suggests that targeted programs are correlated with low public preferences for redistributive 
programs (Larsen, 2008).  
 With universal programs, the stigmatization or shame associated with welfare can be 
eliminated, because everyone is benefitting. In principle, universality means everyone shares the 
same rights and duties. In this case, the programs are not just charity or a safety net for the poor; 
they are benefits to which every citizen has the right. Shifting this frame of mind undoubtedly 
affects public perception and attitudes toward the welfare state. This reflects the idea that social 
policy can bring about change at the individual and societal levels. Relevant research by Jason 
Jordan (2010) suggests the existence of institutional feedback, in which the creation of welfare 
institutions can influence and shape public opinion and attitudes toward the welfare state. Others 
suggest that citizens’ views and opinions regarding solidarity and justice are shaped by the 
context and circumstances of their welfare regime (Arts & Gelissen, 2001). All of these theories 
lead to very similar conclusions; the structure of welfare states plays a critical role in 
determining societal qualities. 
  
Public opinion 
A final essential product of universalism is its effect on public opinion and support. A difficult 
task for nearly all welfare programs is garnering public and political support. In order for any 
social policy to be passed and funded, it needs to have political support. In many cases, political 
support is somewhat, if not wholly, influenced by public opinion. This is important to keep in 
mind. When comparing welfare states, there is no good or bad, or right or wrong; the welfare 
state simply has the goal of creating equality, as observed by Esping-Andersen (1991). The 
different types of welfare states simply reflect different interpretations of equality and different 
approaches to achieve it. In theory, targeted programs would be an effective way to usher in 
equality. The idea is that any resources should be given to those who need it the most, rather than 
the whole population. However, this does not always turn out as intended.  
 Objectively, universalism may seem counterproductive or ineffective in helping those 
who need it the most. Indeed, why give out resources equally when some people do not need it, 
and others cannot live without it? Supporters of this viewpoint might argue that targeted, means-
tested programs would best benefit society by providing support only for the most impoverished 
members. While this argument makes sense in theory, it is shown to be less effective in practice. 
These results create a paradox in which universal programs are more effective at reducing 
poverty than programs directly targeting the poor (Korpi & Palme, 1998; Brady & Bostic, 2015; 
Jacques & Noel, 2018). Researchers Korpi and Palme refer to this as the paradox of 
redistribution (1998). The outcome of this paradox could occur because low-income targeting 
and means-tested programs, in practice, ultimately lead to stigmatization of the poor and those 
who receive benefits. This unexpected outcome is related to reduced public or political support, 
which is essential in the welfare state. Brady describes the paradox, explaining that income-
targeting “stigmatizes the disadvantaged, splits the working class, drives a wedge between the 
poor and others, and discourages broad coalitions for welfare programs” (2015). Since public 
and political support determines the longevity and effectiveness of welfare programs, targeted 
programs are ultimately counterproductive. Since all citizens are recipients of benefits in a 
universal application, the public and political support tend to be exponentially higher.  
 
The paradox of redistribution 
Universalism has a unique interaction with public opinion, which is arguably one of the most 
important requirements for any government action. Public opinion strongly influences political 
support, which is essential for the upkeep and growth of programs. Authors Oliver Jacques and 
Alain Noel (2018) re-examine the original paradox of redistribution (Korpi & Palme, 1998) to 
validate the existence of the paradox in the 21st century. The Jacques-Noel study follows up on 
the paradox, defined almost 20 years prior, in order to examine this relationship in the 21st 
century and respond to those who question the paradox altogether (Brady and Bostic, 2015; 
Kenworthy, 2011; Marx et al., 2013).  
 The newer approach (Jacques and Noel, 2018) departs from the original study and those 
that evaluated it by changing the operationalizations and measurements of key variables. Their 
perspective, unlike others, measures universalism and redistribution through institutional welfare 
design, as opposed to measuring outcomes. Through measuring institutional design, they can 
distinguish more easily between universal and means-tested programs. By not focusing entirely 
on the outcomes, they can avoid exogenous variables. They suggest this methodological shift is 
what allows them to do what those following after Korpi and Palme failed to do; that is, to 
confirm the paradox of redistribution’s existence in the 21st century. Their findings show strong 
positive correlations between universalism, redistribution, and public support, across 20 OECD 
countries. 
 The paradox of redistribution theory supports universalism as an influential political 
strategy, according to Jacques and Noel (2018). This is what makes the paradox so critical within 
the context of this thesis. The paradox of redistribution illustrates how the quality of social 
benefits (universal versus targeted) has a significant effect on income redistribution, poverty 
reduction, inequality, and public support (Jacques and Noel, 2018). Examining the institutional 
design clearly illustrates the impact of universalism. The significance of this topic makes the 
paradox a central element of the thesis. The focus in this thesis is on the critical role universalism 
plays in welfare, and specifically Norway’s social democratic welfare state.  
 In Jacques and Noel’s study, there were limitations based on data availability that 
specifically affected the correlation between universalism and public support. Their study used 
data from the ISSP Role of Government survey, along with the OECD Social Expenditures 
database. At the time, that specific ISSP survey had only been administered once in the years 
following Korpi and Palme’s original study (1998). So, their data regarding public support were 
only from the year 2006. Therefore, Jacques and Noel suggest future research should examine 
the relationship between universalism and public support and its validity over time as new data 
become available (2018). Since their study, there are more data from the ISSP Role of 
Government survey, which allows for the expansion of their study. Using the same data sources 
and methodologies, I plan to continue their study with the more recent data to validate their 
findings regarding public support. This analysis will also allow for a more in-depth look at the 
comparison of Norway and other OECD countries. Expanding on their other variables 
(redistribution, poverty reduction, Gini) with newer data will also be constructive. I hypothesize 
that we should expect to see the same correlation, if not stronger, between universalism and 
public support, as first shown by Jacques and Noel. Finding the same sustained correlations 
between their variables would further support the thesis on the significance of universalism in the 
Nordic social-democratic welfare state.  
 
Revisiting the Paradox of Redistribution: a replication 
In this section, I will be laying out a more thorough review of the previous studies, a summary of 
this thesis’s findings, and a way to incorporate the original concepts of Korpi and Palme. First, it 
is important to take a critical look at what the original study (Korpi and Palme, 1998) used as 
measures and understand why that was not the best method for understanding universalism. 
These criticisms are brought to light in The case for welfare state universalism, or the lasting 
relevance of the paradox of redistribution by Oliver Jacques and Alain Noel (2018). As the title 
suggests, the authors argue that the paradox of redistribution still exists in the 21st century, 
despite what recent research has found. Jacques and Noel (hereafter J&N) contend that the 
paradox still exists, but it just is not being appropriately researched. Their major change to this 
research is the creation of their universalism index. A disadvantage to their paper relates to the 
lack of data at the time of their research, which impedes their findings on the connection between 
universalism and public support. Since then, more data have been published, allowing their 
research to be continued. In this section, I will describe the methods pioneered by J&N, the 
results of my findings, and a discussion on how this replication relates to their original paper. 
Lastly, I will incorporate the approach of Korpi and Palme with J&N by looking at outcomes of 
universalism, along with the institutional design.  
 
Research on the paradox of redistribution 
As previously mentioned, the paradox of redistribution theory is central to understanding the 
political, social, and practical advantages of universalism. The paradox specifically singles out 
universalism as a key factor in successful welfare systems (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Jacques and 
Noel, 2018). This theory differentiates between universal and targeted programs in order to 
evaluate success in terms of poverty reduction, redistribution, equality, and public support.  
 As mentioned before, the work by J&N follows after the paradox of redistribution was 
introduced by Korpi and Palme in 1998 (hereafter K&P). Their hypothesis was that targeted 
welfare benefits would ultimately be less successful in reducing poverty, compared to universal 
benefits. Their study consisted of 11 countries, using data from the Luxembourg Income Study. 
Many followed K&P’s methodology for replicating their research, but found contrasting results.  
 In the original study, K&P used outcomes such as income to measure the effects of 
benefits. They classified countries along the lines of traditional welfare state models, including 
the encompassing, the corporatist, the basic security, and the targeted systems. This deviates 
from the work of Esping-Andersen and the traditional three welfare state models, but it is 
essentially the same, with basic security and targeted together essentially equaling the liberal 
model. Then, they compare these countries based on the outcomes of income inequality and 
poverty rates. Inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient, while the poverty rate is defined 
as the percentage of total population living below 50% of the median income. They also look 
specifically at the levels of social benefit expenditures as a percentage of the GDP for each of the 
countries, which places them on a list from large (encompassing) to small (targeted). 
They measure income redistribution by dividing the difference between market and disposable 
Gini coefficients by the market Gini coefficient. K&P also create the “index of targeting of 
transfer income” to capture the amount of targeting, through transfers towards low-income 
versus high-income households. J&N argue that this index is what led them to measure outcomes 
rather than institutional designs (2018). 
 In their original study, K&P were able to find evidence for the paradox of redistribution 
theory. Many others eventually replicated their study and found conflicting results (Kenworthy, 
2011; Marx et al., 2013; Brady and Bostic, 2015). J&N argue that the mistake from subsequent 
researchers was that they didn’t question K&P’s original operalization of universalism. The first 
clue, as pointed out by J&N, was the high ranking of the US in universalism. Many of these 
scholars were troubled by the United States’ ranking, considering that it is usually considered 
“the poster child for targeting” (Kenworthy, 2011). Each of these authors posed possible 
explanations for why this might be so, including change over time, new definitions of targeting, 
and political shifts. As J&N find, the operationalization of universalism was flawed. With their 
new definition, the US remained at the bottom of the universalism scale (Jacques and Noel, 
2018). The previously high universalism rankings of the US can be explained by pensions, which 
is a large portion of relatively small social expenditures. As J&N describe, this employs a 
concentration coefficient that makes the US appear universal because it doesn’t take into account 
the amount of private spending or proportion of means-targeted programs. What J&N changed in 
their study was the operationalization of universalism. 
 In their new approach to studying the paradox of redistribution, J&N define universalism 
by combining two complementary measures into an index: the proportion of means-tested 
benefits and the percentage of private social expenditures. Additionally, they control for logged 
GDP, unemployment, and old age dependency ratios. This new universalism index, based on 
institutional design rather than outcomes, allowed J&N to root out many exogenous variables. 
They then analyzed the relationship between the universalism index, the redistributive budget, 
inequality, redistribution, poverty reduction, and public support. Other changes to the original 
study include an expansion to 20 countries, the inclusion of more recent data, and access to more 
sophisticated methods of research. 
 As previously mentioned, J&N drew their data from the OECD Social Expenditures 
Database and the ISSP Role of Government Survey 2006. The universalism index was 
constructed entirely using the OECD data, while public support was measured solely through the 
ISSP survey. In the Role of Government survey, J&N focus on one particular question that had 
been employed previously by Brady and Bostic (2015). The question is as follows: “on the 
whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to reduce income 
differences between the rich and poor.” Their measure of public support refers to the percent of 
respondents saying definitely or probably should be. J&N find a moderate (r =.46) positive 
correlation between the universalism index and public support. What is interesting is the case of 
Denmark. This case was an outlier because it had very high levels of universalism but low levels 
of public support. If Denmark is removed, the correlation becomes much stronger (r =.72). J&N  
admit that this case of Denmark “is a puzzle that goes beyond the scope of this article” (2018).  
 In the conclusion of their findings, J&N emphasize the disadvantage of timing in their 
study. There was a lack of available data and a small sample size. The short time span of the 
study is not able to fully capture change in institutions over time. Their study definitely should 
be revisited in a few years from now to get a new perspective and a longer time span of data. At 
the moment, all I can offer is a small addition to their research on public support. The span of 
2006-2016 is not incredibly long and certainly is not enough data, given there were only two 
surveys in total. However, I believe this addition could be very helpful in working to verify the 
positive correlation between universalism and public support, which is something they highlight 
in reference to future studies. My primary hypothesis is that universalism plays a critical role in 
the successful functioning of Norway’s welfare regime. My hypothesis in regards to the 
continuation of J&N’s research is that the positive correlation between universalism and public 
support will be confirmed and strengthened with these new data. 
 
Methods 
Following J&N’s methods, I collected data from the Organizations for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) Social and Welfare Statistics, which includes the Social Expenditure 
Database (SOCX) and Social Benefit Recipients Database (SOCR). Data were collected for the 
years 2005-2016, depending on what was available for each measure. This data were used to 
build the Universalism Index. To measure public support for redistribution, I used the same 
single question from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Role of Government 
survey. Data were collected from the years 2006 and 2016 for a total of 20 countries.2  
 In addition to the data required to compare the Universalism Index and public support for 
redistribution, there were a few other variables from the original study that were involved. I used 
the latest data offered by the OECD for the following variables: redistribution, poverty reduction, 
and Gini. Redistribution was measured by comparing market income Gini to disposable income 
Gini in the same way as J&N. Similarly, poverty reduction was also measured this way by 
comparing market poverty rate and the welfare state poverty rate (before vs after taxes and 
transfers). These variables reflect the sort of outcomes that were measured by K&P in their 1998 
study. The inclusion of them in relation to the Universalism Index allows for insight on the 
relationship between institutional design and these outcomes. 
 In the replication of J&N’s study, I made an effort to mimic their techniques as closely as 
possible. The first step was to create the Universalism Index. In their study, universalism is 
operationalized by two indicators: the percentage of social benefits that are means-tested and the 
proportion of private spending in total social expenditures. They operationalize universalism 
negatively, by measuring the absence of means-testing. This does not catch all of the nuances to 
universalism, but it distinguishes countries that target the poor and rely on private benefits. 
 When collecting data for Indicator One, I referred to the SOCR database and looked 
specifically at the eligibility conditions “means-tested” and “all” in order to calculate the 
percentage of social benefits that are means-tested. For Indicator Two, the source categories 
“private (mandatory and voluntary)” and “net total” were used to calculate the proportion of 
 
2 Countries included in the study are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US. 
private spending in total social expenditures. While it was not specified by J&N which data they 
specifically used, these numbers will be a very close equivalent. 
 The authors combined these two indicators into a single index through factor analysis. 
For this thesis the data was processed initially through R in two different methods and neither 
were successful at a complete replication of J&N’s study. Later, through Stata, the two-variable 
approach was the most successful method.  This factor model nearly replicated the original 
results and any small differences are inconsequential. It is not clear exactly what J&N did in their 
study. 
 The second part of data collection relates to the public support variable. The measure of 
public support for redistribution was gathered from an ISSP survey, as mentioned before. The 
ISSP Role of Government Survey has been administered five times (1985, 1990, 1996, 2006, 
2016). J&N only had access to the survey from 2006. Adding onto this with the data from 2016 
should give more insight to the findings of their study. The years 2006 and 2016 are not 
inclusive3 of all 20 countries in the study and do not match up perfectly with one another, so this 
is a noted limit of the survey. The data are specifically for the question “on the whole, do you 
think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to reduce income differences 
between the rich and poor?” The data reported in the study reflect the percentage of respondents 
who said, “definitely should be” and “probably should be”. The focus on this question stems 
back to the research of Brady and Bostic (2015) where they assert that this question gets at the 
core of support for redistribution most directly. 
 
3 Countries included in 2006 are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US. Countries included in 2016 are Australia, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US. 
 The analysis of these data begins with the creation of the Universalism Index. From there, 
the variables were analyzed through various tests. Using Pearson’s product-moment correlation, 
I compared public support for redistribution with the Universalism Index. I also used this method 
to determine the relationships of Universalism with redistribution, Gini, and poverty reduction. 
Additionally, linear regression models were run between all of these variables. Welch’s t-tests 
were used to determine if and how much public support and Universalism had changed from 
2006 to 2016.   
 
Results 
In J&N’s study, they found a moderate positive correlation (r= 0.46) between public support and 
universalism, which they said was significant at the 0.1 level. Comparatively, based on the 
methods used in this study, I found a stronger positive relationship (r= 0.58) between the two 
variables that was statistically significant (p= 0.03) for the years 2006-2011. This demonstrates 
the imperfect nature of the replication. In regards to whether this trend would continue in the 
future, my hypothesis was that the relationship between these variables would be confirmed and 
strengthened with new data. Interestingly, using data from more recent years (2012-2016) 
showed a relatively weak correlation (r= 0.40) between public support and universalism. 
Furthermore, this correlation was not statistically significant (p= 0.16). These results can be seen 
in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
Figures 1 & 2 
 
 
When examining the change over time, specifically in universalism and public support, findings 
showed little variance. In both of these variables, the means remained essentially the same. The 
mean public support in 2006 was 0.68, and in 2016, it was still 0.68. For universalism, the mean 
in 2006 was 9.8e-11, and in 2016 it was 1.1e-09 (both essentially equaling zero). The changes 
over time are depicted in Figures 3-6, where the blue line indicates the mean. Welch’s t-tests 
were conducted to compare these two variables against themselves in 2006 and 2016. There was 
no significant difference in the public support scores of 2006 and 2016 (t= -0.28, df= 26.6, 
p=0.78). Similarly, there was no significant difference for the universalism scores either (t= -
1.12e-08, df= 34, p=1). Based on the results of these t-tests and Figures 3-6, it is clear that there 
were no significant changes between 2006 and 2016 for these two variables. 
It is important to remember that both groups (2006 & 2016) contain slight variations in the 
number of countries represented in the dataset. Additionally, the matter of specifically comparing 
public support and universalism is different. You will notice in Figures 1 and 2 that there are 
slight variations in the number of countries. This is partly due to the ISSP sample size and also 
because of missing values when calculating the Universalism Index.  
 
Figures 3-6 
 
 
 
In addition to examining the relationship between universalism and public support for 
redistribution, I also looked at the variables of redistribution, Gini, and poverty reduction. In 
J&N’s study, they also examined the relationship between these variables. They found a 
significant positive correlation between redistribution and Gini (r= -0.77, p≤ 0.01). In my 
findings, there appears to still be a strong negative correlation (r= -0.71) that is statistically 
significant (p≤ 0.001). This can be seen in Figure 7.4 It should be noted, as mentioned earlier, 
that redistribution was calculated using measures of market and disposable Gini (before and after 
 
4 The country IDs for figures 7-9- (1) Australia, (2) Austria, (3) Belgium, (4) Canada, (5), Denmark, (6) Finland, (7) 
France, (8) Germany, (9) Ireland, (10) Italy, (11) Japan, (12) Netherlands, (13) New Zealand, (14) Norway, (15) 
Portugal, (16) Spain, (17) Sweden, (18) Switzerland, (19) UK, (20) US. 
taxes and transfers). The Gini index itself measures a nation’s income equality, with lower scores 
indicating more equality (scale of 0-100). It seems intuitive that these two measures would be so 
closely related.  
Figure 7 
 
Next, I looked at the relationship between universalism and redistribution. These two variables 
were compared in J&N’s study as well. They found a strong positive correlation (r= 0.66) 
between universalism and redistribution that was statistically significant (p≤	0.01). Using more 
recent data, there appeared to be a slightly weaker but still significant correlation between these 
variables (r= 0.55, p= 0.01). Similarly, universalism and poverty reduction follow the same 
pattern. In the J&N study, there was a strong positive correlation (r= 0.56, p≤ 0.01), however the 
more recent data showed weaker results. There is still a positive correlation (r= 0.45) but it is not 
as strong as J&N’s findings. However, this correlation still is statistically significant (p= 0.05). 
For the relationships of universalism with redistribution and poverty reduction, the correlation is 
still significant and positive even though it seems to have weakened slightly.  
 
 
 
 
Figures 8-9 
 
 
 
The most significant finding of these correlation tests was for the relationship between 
redistribution and poverty reduction. As mentioned before, redistribution is measured through a 
comparison between market and disposable income Gini. Poverty reduction is created with a 
similar index. This was done by comparing market poverty rate and the welfare state poverty rate 
(after taxes and transfers), with both poverty rates measured as below 50% of the median 
income. In J&N’s study, they found a very strong, statistically significant positive correlation (r= 
0.88, p≤	0.01) between redistribution and poverty reduction. The more recent data presented in 
my findings show an even stronger relationship. As shown in Figure 10, you can clearly see a 
very strong correlation (r= 0.91) between these two variables. This relationship is also 
statistically significant (p≤ 0.0001). As mentioned earlier, this relationship is by far the 
strongest amongst the findings of this study. It is also the only relationship in which the 
correlation and statistical significance were strengthened since the earlier findings of J&N.  
 
 
Figure 10 
 
 
All of the correlations mentioned in this section can also be seen in Table 1. It should be noted 
that the universalism value used for these correlations is specifically the Universalism Index for 
2016. The rest of the variables are also representative of the most recent data. This creates a clear 
distinction from similar correlations ran in J&N’s study.5 As shown in Table 1, the only result 
that was not statistically significant was the correlation between universalism and Gini.  
 
Table 1   
  Universalism Gini Redistribution Poverty Reduction 
Universalism 1.00       
Gini -0.40 1.00 
  
Redistribution 0.55** -0.71*** 1.00 
 
Poverty Reduction 0.45* -0.74*** 0.91*** 1.00 
P= *0.05, **0.01, *** ≤0.001 
   
 
5 These correlations, along with all of their findings, can be found either in their article or in their online appendix.  
 
 
Discussion 
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the new findings is the relationship between universalism 
and public support for the more recent years (2016). When replicating the original study, I found 
a stronger significant correlation between these variables in 2006 (r= 0.58, p= 0.03). However, 
the results for the correlation in 2016 were weaker and not statistically significant (r= 0.40, p= 
0.16). Obviously, these results defy the expectations that the correlation would be stronger in the 
more recent years. What makes this more puzzling is the lack of significant change between 
2006 and 2016 in both universalism and public support (as shown in Figures 3-6). If there was no 
change in the means of these variables, what accounts for the dramatic change in the correlation?  
 One argument is simply that universalism and public support for redistribution are not 
correlated. The inconsistency between 2006’s strong results and 2016’s insignificant results 
could hint that there is no strong connection between them. It could be that J&N’s original 
hypothesis, and my subsequent hypothesis, that these variables are strongly related were both 
disproven. However, in 2016 we still observe somewhat of a positive relationship between these 
variables, even if not significant. Another possible explanation for these puzzling results relates 
to the operationalization of the variables and the overall power of the study. 
 As mentioned earlier, public support for redistribution was measured through responses 
to one single question, “on the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s 
responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and poor?” While this captures 
redistribution conceptually, as a matter of redistributing wealth to create equality, is it enough? It 
should be considered whether this question alone is enough to determine public support for 
redistribution. It is possible that the wording and framing of this question within the survey could 
have influenced results. If this is the case, future research could look into other methods of 
measuring this variable or use other questions within the ISSP survey. On another note, the small 
sample size for this study severely decreases the power of these findings. The overall sample is 
n= 20, but when broken down to analyze public support and redistribution, each graph only has 
around 14 countries. This sample size was diminished largely due to missing values and the odd 
survey methods of the ISSP. With such a small number of cases and a relatively small amount of 
time (in totality, my data range from 2005-2016), it is hard to make any substantial claims about 
the relationship between these variables.  
 Another interesting finding in this study was the slight increase in the significant positive 
correlation between redistribution and poverty reduction (r= 0.91, p≤ 0.001), as compared to 
J&N’s study (r= 0.88, p≤	0.01). Overall, redistribution also had strong correlations with Gini (r= 
-0.71, p≤ 0.001) and universalism (r= 0.55, p= 0.01). This is also consistent with J&N’s 
findings. Welfare redistribution is essentially the redistributing of wealth and resources across 
the population, so it would make sense for it to be correlated with Gini, which measures a 
country’s income inequality. It is also intuitive that both redistribution and Gini would have a 
strong relationship with poverty reduction.  
 When re-evaluating J&N’s findings as a whole, it is important to consider the main 
question of whether or not the paradox of redistribution still exists. Based on the correlations of 
the variables Table 1, they concluded that the paradox exists. In their considerations, they 
mention the positive correlation between universalism and redistribution and the correlation 
between redistribution and poverty. They state that their findings match with what the literature 
on the paradox would predict. My findings nearly mirror J&N’s results concerning correlations 
between the variables in Table 1. Some correlations are slightly weakened, as mentioned earlier, 
mainly between universalism and the other variables. However, most of these correlations6 of 
universalism are still moderate-to-strong and statistically significant. Strikingly, the correlations 
between redistribution and other variables strengthened since J&N’s study. Based on these 
results, I am inclined to support J&N’s conclusion that the paradox still exists. However, it is 
difficult to say anything conclusively, largely because of limitations of the sample size and data 
availability.  
The Case of Norway 
When looking at Norway’s positioning (#14) in these figures, it is usually placed on the higher 
ends of universalism, redistribution, and poverty reduction and has one of the lowest values for 
Gini. In the context of this operationalization of universalism, Norway is one of the most 
universal countries in the study. An in-depth look shows the percentage of social benefits that are 
means-tested is less than 6%, as an average for the years 2007-2016. Furthermore, the proportion 
of social spending that is private remained at 11% from 2005-2016.7 Comparatively, these 
figures are much lower than those in the US are (25% means-tested, 41% private spending) and 
are on par with other Scandinavian countries, like Sweden (13% means-testing, 12% private 
spending). When universalism is defined as low levels of private social spending and means-
tested benefits, Norway falls in the top third. Norway has also had consistent high levels of 
public support for redistribution. The percentage of respondents supporting redistribution went 
from 74% in 2006 to 78% in 2016.  
 
6 The only correlation result that is not statistically significant is between universalism and Gini.  
7 These data come directly from the OECD SOCX and SOCR. These figures are from the indicators that make up the 
Universalism Index 
 In Norway, there is a clear trend between universalism, redistribution, and the other 
variables mentioned. As the graphs shown earlier demonstrate, Norway is on the higher ends of 
the universalism and redistribution scales, and it also has high poverty reduction, high public 
support, and a low Gini score. J&N’s study and my replication both focused on the importance of 
institutional design, especially when measuring universalism, as opposed to solely measuring 
outcomes. However, these outcome variables certainly are important and offer the information 
necessary to study universalism. While J&N focus on outcomes of income equality, poverty 
levels, and wealth redistribution, there could be other variables that might offer a more 
comprehensive view. How are social outcomes connected to universalism and redistribution? 
 Briefly, it is worth mentioning the various social conditions and characteristics that have 
made Scandinavian countries stand out as some of the happiest places to live. While it is not 
within the scope of this paper to speculate over causation, it is important to acknowledge the 
unique qualities that coincide with these unique welfare states. What has drawn attention to 
Norway in particular these past few years is its status as one of the happiest countries among the 
OECD (World Happiness Reports, 2012-2019). Additionally, the other Nordic and Scandinavian 
countries are also consistently ranked as the most happy. Later, I will explore some of the other 
factors that contribute to this. However, it seems intuitive for the average person to draw the 
connection between universal welfare systems and happiness, especially since both are in such 
high forms in Scandinavia.  
 The World Happiness Report describes happiness as the “proper measure of social 
progress and the goal of public policy” (WHR, 2017). They measure happiness through the 
Cantril life ladder8, GDP per capita, healthy life expectancy, social support, freedom to make life 
 
8 The Cantril Ladder asks survey respondents to place the status of their lives on a “ladder” scale ranging from 0 to 
10, where 0 means the worst possible life and 10 the best possible life.  
choices, generosity, perceptions of corruption, positive affect, and negative affect. Each of these 
indicators are influenced by social and public policies, such as health care, education, and social 
insurance. Over the past seven years, Norway has been among the top five countries in 
happiness. In 2017, it was ranked as the happiest country. In 2019, Norway was ranked in the top 
ten for the Cantril life ladder, social support, freedom to make life choices, and GDP per capita. 
They also are ranked eighth for the lowest scores in perceptions of corruption. All of these 
variables, and the overall happiness rankings, could be seen as an indirect by-product of various 
social and public policies.  
 The OECD’s Better Life Index also takes a more in-depth look at Norway and offers 
more insight specifically on the role of redistribution (2019). In their report, Norway ranks first 
in personal security and ranks above the OECD average for most of the other indicators.9 When 
asked about their attitudes towards social services, 82% of respondents reported being highly 
satisfied with both health and education social services. The report attributes many of these 
outcomes to redistribution, egalitarianism, and social cohesion. Specifically in regards to 
Norway’s life satisfaction scores, they state, “these high scores may be related to the Norwegian 
model of a relatively egalitarian society, where social consensus and a high degree of 
inclusiveness are important” (OECD Better Life Index- Norway). They discuss how Norway’s 
tax system, public welfare services, low wage inequality, high labor-force participation, and 
subsequent redistribution all feed into their egalitarian society. This is certainly an interesting 
relationship and would be worthwhile to research in the future.  
 These statistics offered by the World Happiness Report and the Better Life Index are 
useful in understanding the societal aspects that are connected to universalism and welfare. 
 
9 Norway ranks above average in subjective wellbeing, environmental quality, jobs and earnings, income and 
wealth, education, housing, work-life balance, civic engagement, social connections, and health status. 
While J&N’s study works well enough to consider the existence of the paradox of redistribution, 
it’s not comprehensive enough to paint a complete picture. Just as no country is a complete fit for 
one welfare model, no country has a welfare system that is isolated from social factors such as 
happiness and wellbeing. A more comprehensive approach combines research on the institutional 
designs, economic outcomes, and social qualities of welfare states. What I offer here isn’t a full, 
statistical analysis of these variables, but is instead simply a brief view. I think it says something 
that Norway is one of the only places to have a universal social democratic welfare state, while 
also being consistently ranked as one of the top five countries for happiness and wellbeing. This 
pattern also seems to extend to the rest of Scandinavia, where similar welfare states are in place 
and there are similar social conditions. The connections between universalism, redistribution, 
and happiness are important to keep in mind when examining Norway’s welfare state.  
 
Confounding variables, interference, and confidence 
The previous two sections explore the demonstrated significance of universalism and the 
connection to increased redistribution, increased poverty reduction, and decreased income 
inequality. The findings of this paper support J&N’s conclusion that the paradox of redistribution 
still exists. However, these findings in total still come up short of demonstrating causation by 
any means. Regardless, it can be seen that universalism plays a significant role within the 
welfare state based on the findings of this paper. The question now is to what degree does 
universalism influence the outcomes, and what other variables might be playing a role? 
 Without a doubt, there are many factors that make Norway a unique place in comparison 
to the rest of the OECD countries. In general, Norway has a small population size, relatively high 
levels of cultural and ethnic homogeneity, and large amounts of wealth. Additionally, Norway is 
a westernized country, which separates it from some other members of the OECD. All of these 
factors influence the high levels of social cohesion, egalitarianism, happiness, and wellbeing in 
one way or another. Any social policies are automatically affected by Norway’s unique 
circumstances. Therefore, there are many discussions around Norwegian exceptionalism and 
how this fundamentally influences everything, including the welfare system. 
 Norway is a relatively small country with a nearly homogeneous population; the 
population is 83% ethnically Norwegian and 70% Evangelical Lutheran (CIA World Factbook). 
While the proportion of immigrants and refugees is increasing, especially in urban areas, the 
overall population is still culturally and ethnically homogeneous. This could play a role in the 
strong political and social consensus in Norway. Both population-wise and geographically, 
Norway is a small country. This may also facilitate universal welfare programs.  
 Norway is famously known for its wealth from the oil industry, which many credit as the 
key to the welfare system’s success. However, there is much regarding Norway’s economy that 
is based on misconceptions. The first misconception is about the influence of their oil industry. 
The oil sector in Norway makes up 12% of the GDP, 13% of the state’s revenues, and 9% of 
jobs. The petroleum sector remains an influential export commodity. Increasingly, Norway’s oil 
industry is comparable, if not overshadowed by its fishing industry10. Norway might have struck 
gold with its discovery of oil in the late 1900s, but the welfare state is not entirely dependent 
upon it. If anything could be seen as a major economic advantage in Norway, it would be their 
fiscal policies and budgeting. Norway has the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund (recently 
valued at over 1 trillion USD)11, which has been impacted by substantial investment and strict 
regulations on spending. The wealth fund began with savings profits from the oil, but it has 
 
10 CIA world factbook 
11 Norges Bank Investment Management 
grown into the largest sovereign wealth fund due to smart investing and money-management on 
the part of the Norwegian government. On another note, some regard Sweden as having a more 
advanced welfare regime than Norway in some instances, yet oil is not listed as one of its top 
industries (CIA WFB). Therefore, one could conclude that oil revenues are not an essential 
component of the Nordic welfare model.  
 Another important factor to consider is the unique cultures of the Nordic countries.  
Some people explain their high levels of happiness to cultural and societal factors. A prime 
example is Hygge, which is a Danish way of life. A few years ago, Hygge was a major trend that 
made its way into mainstream media around the world. The concept is built around coziness, 
warmth, and comfort. There is a book titled The Year of Living Danishly: Uncovering the Secrets 
of the World’s Happiest Country (Russell, 2015). People are eager to find out the “key” to this 
happiness and some view this lifestyle as a central piece. It is without a doubt that there is a high 
standard of living in Scandinavia12 but it is also intuitive to connect this to social policy and 
welfare. According to the Better Life Index, Norway is ranked 9.6 for the environment, 9.9 in 
life satisfaction, and 10 in safety (each of these being out of 10). All of these are influenced by 
various policies: environmental protection and regulation, paid vacation and parental leave, 
universal healthcare, unemployment benefits, and free education, just to name a few. As the 
Better Life Index puts it, “the generous provision of public services also plays a major role in 
Norwegian’s personal fulfillment and well-being” (2019). 
 Tied into everything mentioned above is the concept of Nordic exceptionalism, or the 
belief that there is something truly unique and extraordinary that separates these countries from 
the rest of the world. There is a national narrative and identity centered on peace, egalitarianism, 
 
12 OECD Better Life Index, World Happiness Report 
and social justice. An example of this is the “radical humaneness”13 that is associated with their 
restorative justice-based penal system. The term Nordic exceptionalism has become somewhat of 
an explanation for the social democratic welfare regimes themselves. So, is this exceptionalism 
the secret to their success? 
 Homogeneity, vast wealth, unique cultural features- all of this describes Norway. They 
all provide a holistic view of the country, especially within the context of discussing the welfare 
state. We do not know the exact amount of influence each of these factors have had. However, 
we do know that the universality of their welfare benefits has a role to play. The high volume of 
universal benefits exists side-by-side high levels of social cohesion, solidarity, and trust. 
Theories such as the institutional feedback loop and the paradox of redistribution help explain 
how the institutional design of welfare programs interacts with and affects other social factors. 
  
Conclusion 
The study of welfare regimes is never clear-cut and simple. It is plagued with external factors 
that make it tricky to compare welfare regimes across nations. However, it is the aim of this field 
to gain more knowledge on how social policy and welfare can be best suited to run efficiently 
and successfully. Of course, this means something different for every country. In the Nordic 
model of welfare, universalism that appears to be most compatible with their societies, cultures, 
and needs. However, there are some things we can learn about their social democratic welfare 
model in the effort to form the best public and social policies.  
 Universalism, the hallmark of social democratic welfare, plays a significant role in the 
effectiveness of the Nordic system. It is important in decommodifying labor, removing stigma 
 
13 Benko, 2015 
from welfare, and bolstering public and political support. This last factor, public support, is 
where the interaction with universalism gets interesting. Is Norwegian exceptionalism what 
makes universal welfare possible, or is Norway exceptional because of universal welfare? 
Theories such as institutional feedback suggest the latter to be more accurate (Jordan, 2010). If 
this is the case, what is it about universalism that increases public support? According to the 
paradox of redistribution (Korpi and Palme, 1998), it goes back to the ability of universal 
benefits to build social cohesion and strong coalitions in favor of welfare. Herein lies the 
comparison of universal versus means-tested programs.  
 The three types of welfare states (liberal, conservative, and social democratic) that serve 
as blueprints distinguish broadly between forms of welfare. The dichotomy between targeting 
and universalism is at the center of it all, with liberal welfare on one side and social democratic 
on the other. The main question many scholars have sought to answer is which strategy works 
best. The paradox is an explanation for why targeted programs fall short, when in theory they 
may seem the most logical. This relates back to public and political support, which is essential 
for the upkeep and funding of welfare benefits. Because it is able to shore up broad support, 
universalism becomes the central key in the paradox of redistribution. With Norway being one of 
the most “pure” social democratic welfare states, it is a great case study for the exploration of 
universalism.  
 The paradox has been revisited many times since its inception in 1998 (Kenworthy, 2001; 
Marx et al., 2013; Brady and Bostic, 2015; Jacques and Noel, 2018). With some researchers 
finding conflicting evidence, it seemed as though the paradox didn’t exist in the 21st century. 
Jacques and Noel (2018) broke the pattern to redefine and operationalize universalism differently 
from how Korpi and Palme (1998) did originally. Instead of focusing on outcomes, they measure 
universalism through institutional design. Namely, the proportion of means-tested social benefits 
and the proportion of private social spending. Their results suggested the existence of the 
paradox in the 21st century. A small shortcoming was the lack of data in general, but especially 
in regards to measuring public support for redistribution.  
 In part of this thesis, I attempt to replicate Jacques and Noel’s study with more recent 
data. There were still significant correlations between universalism, redistribution, poverty relief, 
and inequality. Based on how Jacques and Noel concluded the existence of the paradox, I am 
able to say my findings support their claim. However, the relationship between universalism and 
public support was not supported in my findings. In the recent data, there was a slight correlation 
between the two but it was not statistically significant. As discussed earlier, this could be the 
effect of how public support was measured, the scattered sample sizes, or the possibility of no 
relationship existing in the real world. In regards to the study as a whole, the sample size was 
relatively small and had low statistical power. Because of this, my findings could not come close 
to making assumptions or drawing conclusions about causation, by any means.  
 When examining the unique circumstances in Norway, there is also a shadow looming of 
the many factors that could be affecting these results. The instance of Norwegian exceptionalism 
can be interpreted as both a hidden causal factor and a dependent outcome. Without having the 
information to know one way or the other, it is hard to draw conclusions. What we know is that 
high volumes of universal benefits are alongside high levels of trust, social cohesion, and 
solidarity. Furthermore, this unique combination of social qualities and universal welfare also 
happens to be prevalent in the happiest countries in the world.  
 Undoubtedly, more research needs to be done on this topic. For further research, I would 
also suggest a broader study of how we measure public support and a significant effort to 
improve the operationalization of universalism. Jacques and Noel themselves admit their 
measure isn’t perfect since it measures universalism as simply the absence of means-testing. 
Research on this topic will not be as precise as possible until we can accurately operationalize  
the nuances of universalism. Additionally, further research specifically on the Nordic welfare 
model could provide a wealth of knowledge and work towards breaking down how much of their 
welfare is owed to Norwegian exceptionalism. In a country where happiness and quality of living 
are so highly rated, it may be worthwhile to explore what factors are responsible and if they 
could be employed in further construction of social policy. When the aim of social policy is to 
improve wellbeing and prosperity in a country, further investigation of Norway could be fruitful.  
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